Research paper

And No One Gets the Short End of the Stick: A Blockchain-Based Approach to Solving the Two-Sided Opportunism Problem in Interorganizational Information Sharing

To counter two-sided opportunism (information poaching by the recipient and information manipulation by the provider), the paper derives three design principles for an IS that facilitates reliable information sharing on sensitive data without revealing the actual data, and instantiates them in a machine-tool leasing consortium.

PaperOpen source resource ↗

Overview

Publication metadata and narrative from the current library record.

Authors: Lukas Florian Bossler, Arne Buchwald, Kai Spohrer
Year: 2025
Venue: Information Systems Research 36(3), 2025, 1565-1586
Methodology: Design science research; multicompany consortium (wear-based machine-tool leasing); expert interviews; survey-based evaluation.

blockchaindesign-science-researchinformation-sharinginterorganizationalmanufacturingshort-end-opportunism-sharingtrust

And No One Gets the Short End of the Stick: A Blockchain-Based Approach to Solving the Two-Sided Opportunism Problem in Interorganizational Information Sharing

Authors: Lukas Florian Bossler, Arne Buchwald, Kai Spohrer
Venue: Information Systems Research 36(3), 2025, 1565-1586
Link: https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2022.0065 (opens in a new tab)

Summary

Artifact

An information system that enables sensitive interorganizational information sharing without revealing the underlying data.

Methodology

Design science research; multicompany consortium (wear-based machine-tool leasing); expert interviews; survey-based evaluation.

Citations

[1] Lukas Florian Bossler, Arne Buchwald, Kai Spohrer. And No One Gets the Short End of the Stick: A Blockchain-Based Approach to Solving the Two-Sided Opportunism Problem in Interorganizational Information Sharing. Information Systems Research 36(3), 2025, 1565-1586. https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2022.0065 (opens in a new tab) [2] Source document: And No One Gets the Short End of the Stick.pdf

DSR grid

Six dimensions represented in the current paper record.

Problem description

Two-sided opportunism - information poaching by the recipient and information manipulation by the provider - can preclude beneficial interorganizational information sharing based on sensitive data.

Input knowledge

Opportunism from a transaction-cost/agency perspective; prior organizational and technical countermeasures against opportunism; blockchain.

Research process

Design science research in a multicompany consortium for wear-based machine-tool leasing: workshops, in-depth expert interviews (demonstration), and a survey-based utility evaluation.

Key concepts

Information sharing, interorganizational information systems, opportunism, poaching, manipulation, blockchain.

Solution description

An information system that shares information derived from sensitive data without revealing it, via confidential storage with proof of integrity, nonreversible independent computation, and joint approval. Solution-space representation: Instantiation (consortium artifact) plus three design principles (design theory).

Output knowledge

Three design principles addressing the prevention of manipulation (DR1) and poaching (DR2).

Design knowledge

Directly linked concepts, grouped by their represented design-knowledge category.

Design Principle

Design Principle3

Design Principle

design-knowledge/short-end-opportunism-sharing-dp1

DP1 - Confidential storage with proof of integrity

Store the sensitive data in a manipulation-resistant storage exclusively with the information provider and instantly create a manipulation-resistant proof of integrity for the information recipient...

design-principleinformation-sharinginterorganizationalmanufacturing+2

Design Principle

design-knowledge/short-end-opportunism-sharing-dp2

DP2 - Nonreversible shared computation

Utilize nonreversible functions that are reliably and independently executed to compute the shared information from the confidentially stored sensitive data, allowing predefinition of what informat...

design-principleinformation-sharinginterorganizationalmanufacturing+2

Design Principle

design-knowledge/short-end-opportunism-sharing-dp3

DP3 - Joint approval of computation changes

Require joint approval for any changes to the computation mechanisms, so that no single party controls the key data.

design-principleinformation-sharinginterorganizationalmanufacturing+2

Design Requirement

Design Requirement2

Design Requirement

design-knowledge/short-end-opportunism-sharing-dr1

DR1 - Prevent information manipulation

The system must prevent the information provider from manipulating the sensitive information it contributes.

design-requirementinformation-sharinginterorganizationalmanufacturing+2

Design Requirement

design-knowledge/short-end-opportunism-sharing-dr2

DR2 - Prevent information poaching

The system must prevent the information recipient from poaching (misappropriating) the provider's sensitive data.

design-requirementinformation-sharinginterorganizationalmanufacturing+2

Paper design map

The default semantic design map canonicalizes stored design relationships; Raw links retains the complete technical Markdown-link view.

Design-knowledge map

5 stored concepts / 6 canonical semantic relationships

Concept types

Show relationship labels

Publication metadata

Additional metadata represented in the current library record.

Show additional metadata

{
  "type": "paper",
  "title": "And No One Gets the Short End of the Stick: A Blockchain-Based Approach to Solving the Two-Sided Opportunism Problem in Interorganizational Information Sharing",
  "description": "To counter two-sided opportunism (information poaching by the recipient and information manipulation by the provider), the paper derives three design principles for an IS that facilitates reliable information sharing on sensitive data without revealing the actual data, and instantiates them in a machine-tool leasing consortium.",
  "resource": "https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2022.0065",
  "authors": "Lukas Florian Bossler, Arne Buchwald, Kai Spohrer",
  "year": 2025,
  "venue": "Information Systems Research 36(3), 2025, 1565-1586",
  "methodology": "Design science research; multicompany consortium (wear-based machine-tool leasing); expert interviews; survey-based evaluation.",
  "dsr_grid": true,
  "dsr_solution_space": "Instantiation (consortium artifact) plus three design principles (design theory).",
  "tags": [
    "short-end-opportunism-sharing",
    "interorganizational",
    "information-sharing",
    "trust",
    "manufacturing",
    "design-science-research",
    "blockchain"
  ]
}

Research paper

And No One Gets the Short End of the Stick: A Blockchain-Based Approach to Solving the Two-Sided Opportunism Problem in Interorganizational Information Sharing

PaperOpen source resource ↗

Overview

Publication metadata and narrative from the current library record.

Authors: Lukas Florian Bossler, Arne Buchwald, Kai Spohrer
Year: 2025
Venue: Information Systems Research 36(3), 2025, 1565-1586
Methodology: Design science research; multicompany consortium (wear-based machine-tool leasing); expert interviews; survey-based evaluation.

blockchaindesign-science-researchinformation-sharinginterorganizationalmanufacturingshort-end-opportunism-sharingtrust

And No One Gets the Short End of the Stick: A Blockchain-Based Approach to Solving the Two-Sided Opportunism Problem in Interorganizational Information Sharing

Authors: Lukas Florian Bossler, Arne Buchwald, Kai Spohrer
Venue: Information Systems Research 36(3), 2025, 1565-1586
Link: https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2022.0065 (opens in a new tab)

Summary

Artifact

An information system that enables sensitive interorganizational information sharing without revealing the underlying data.

Methodology

Design science research; multicompany consortium (wear-based machine-tool leasing); expert interviews; survey-based evaluation.

Citations

DSR grid

Six dimensions represented in the current paper record.

Problem description

Two-sided opportunism - information poaching by the recipient and information manipulation by the provider - can preclude beneficial interorganizational information sharing based on sensitive data.

Input knowledge

Opportunism from a transaction-cost/agency perspective; prior organizational and technical countermeasures against opportunism; blockchain.

Research process

Design science research in a multicompany consortium for wear-based machine-tool leasing: workshops, in-depth expert interviews (demonstration), and a survey-based utility evaluation.

Key concepts

Information sharing, interorganizational information systems, opportunism, poaching, manipulation, blockchain.

Solution description

Output knowledge

Three design principles addressing the prevention of manipulation (DR1) and poaching (DR2).

Design knowledge

Directly linked concepts, grouped by their represented design-knowledge category.

Design Principle

Design Principle3

Design Principle

design-knowledge/short-end-opportunism-sharing-dp1

DP1 - Confidential storage with proof of integrity

design-principleinformation-sharinginterorganizationalmanufacturing+2

Design Principle

design-knowledge/short-end-opportunism-sharing-dp2

DP2 - Nonreversible shared computation

design-principleinformation-sharinginterorganizationalmanufacturing+2

Design Principle

design-knowledge/short-end-opportunism-sharing-dp3

DP3 - Joint approval of computation changes

Require joint approval for any changes to the computation mechanisms, so that no single party controls the key data.

design-principleinformation-sharinginterorganizationalmanufacturing+2

Design Requirement

Design Requirement2

Design Requirement

design-knowledge/short-end-opportunism-sharing-dr1

DR1 - Prevent information manipulation

The system must prevent the information provider from manipulating the sensitive information it contributes.

design-requirementinformation-sharinginterorganizationalmanufacturing+2

Design Requirement

design-knowledge/short-end-opportunism-sharing-dr2

DR2 - Prevent information poaching

The system must prevent the information recipient from poaching (misappropriating) the provider's sensitive data.

design-requirementinformation-sharinginterorganizationalmanufacturing+2

Paper design map

The default semantic design map canonicalizes stored design relationships; Raw links retains the complete technical Markdown-link view.

Design-knowledge map

5 stored concepts / 6 canonical semantic relationships

Concept types

Show relationship labels

Publication metadata

Additional metadata represented in the current library record.

Show additional metadata

{
  "type": "paper",
  "title": "And No One Gets the Short End of the Stick: A Blockchain-Based Approach to Solving the Two-Sided Opportunism Problem in Interorganizational Information Sharing",
  "description": "To counter two-sided opportunism (information poaching by the recipient and information manipulation by the provider), the paper derives three design principles for an IS that facilitates reliable information sharing on sensitive data without revealing the actual data, and instantiates them in a machine-tool leasing consortium.",
  "resource": "https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2022.0065",
  "authors": "Lukas Florian Bossler, Arne Buchwald, Kai Spohrer",
  "year": 2025,
  "venue": "Information Systems Research 36(3), 2025, 1565-1586",
  "methodology": "Design science research; multicompany consortium (wear-based machine-tool leasing); expert interviews; survey-based evaluation.",
  "dsr_grid": true,
  "dsr_solution_space": "Instantiation (consortium artifact) plus three design principles (design theory).",
  "tags": [
    "short-end-opportunism-sharing",
    "interorganizational",
    "information-sharing",
    "trust",
    "manufacturing",
    "design-science-research",
    "blockchain"
  ]
}